Conversing with van der Velde: IPO and the Cognitive Subject
The first issue that van der Velde (2007) raises is that I have overlooked an important reason why tagging theories, like synchrony of activation, fail to explain object feature binding in visual consciousness. What I have overlooked in my critical examination of tagging theories could be called the intrinsic perspective objection (hereafter IPO). Much of van der Velde's commentary is built around this concern, so I will focus most of my attention upon it. Van der Velde argues that a fundamental reason why tagging theories fail to explain the unity of an object's features in visual consciousness is that these theories are motivated by and essentially linked to considerations drawn from the extrinsic perspective. Neuroscientists can make observations of neuronal synchrony occurring in different areas of the visual cortex, but this type of observation is ultimately an 'observation from an extrinsic (laboratory) perspective ' (van der Velde, p. 793) . After having discovered the local information-processing areas of the visual cortex (and synchrony of activation in those areas), some researchers might conclude that a theory of global information processing (e.g., an account of the unity of an object's features in visual consciousness) has been achieved. But this inference would be mistaken on grounds that the situation is essentially different from inside the brain: 'from the perspective of a neuron buried deep within the cortex, the situation is different. It has only an intrinsic perspective, which does not allow it to "look beyond its horizon" ' (p. 793) . Van der Velde concludes that solving the object feature binding problem is akin to solving a global information problem, and thus a solution to the former problem would involve a processing approach that extends 'beyond the local information obtainable within each of the different brain areas involved ' (p. 793) .
Indeed, if the scope of a neuron's perspective is inextricably tied to the scope of its specialization area, that perspective will not be able to take up a global point of view. Object consciousness requires a global point of view. Any theory of object consciousness that fails to account for such a view should be rejected. Synchrony of activation and other tagging theories are logically compatible with the absence of a global point of view and consequently should be rejected. This would suggest that a 'globally unified awareness' of an object (i.e., a feature-unified object of visual consciousness) is not automatically guaranteed by the intrinsic awarenesses of separate features occurring at the same time (LaRock, 2002, p. 252 ). An analogy: if five chefs are located in separate kitchens and each chef is aware of only part of the recipe, it does not follow that any one chef is aware of the recipe as a whole-even if all of the chefs are aware of their respective recipe parts at the same time. Like van der Velde, I have argued elsewhere that one's globally unified awareness of an object's features cannot be due to the awarenesses of distinct features correlated with neuronal events distributed across the visual cortex:
If each nerve cell or neuronal set represents a feature of visual awareness, then each nerve cell or neuronal set is aware only of part and not of the whole. The individual nerve cells may be aware of distinct features of visual information, but this fails to explain the unitary character of visual awareness. … The partial awareness of individual nerve cells in distinct neural clusters does not constitute, or add up to, the person's globally unified awareness. (LaRock, 2002, p. 252) It is difficult to see how separate visual feature awarenesses-whether those awarenesses are correlated with synchrony of activation, or coalitions of neurons sustained at a high rate, or neurons firing in bursts-could correspond to one's globally unified awareness of an object. Why not suppose that if visual consciousness of red and of triangle is directly correlated with synchrony of activation in different areas of the visual cortex, that visual 'consciousness would actually look like a theatre of distinct visual object-properties minus 800 THEORY & PSYCHOLOGY 17(6) phenomenal unity ' (LaRock, 2002, p. 255) ? 1 What appears to be missing from tagging theories, like synchrony of activation, is the spatial relatedness of an object's features, the particular connections of which must be established for the unity of an object's features to appear in visual consciousness. Synchrony of activation fails to explain object feature binding because it leaves out the spatial structure required for binding. How are we visually conscious of a red triangle? Presumably, the cognitive subject is aware of the red triangle as a single, unitary object because the redness is bound to the same spatial areas as the triangle (LaRock, 2007) . In sum, I agree with van der Velde's IPO and have constructed arguments elsewhere, as shown above, that are compatible with it. Strictly speaking, then, I have not overlooked (or 'ignored') this type of objection. Rather, it would be more accurate to say that this type of objection was not included in my article, even though it appears in an earlier work of mine (LaRock, 2002) .
Van der Velde raises briefly a concern about my reference to the cognitive subject in the context of discussing Zeki's (2003) notions of micro-consciousness and macro-consciousness. Van der Velde suggests that invoking the cognitive subject will have no explanatory payoff because it comes dangerously close to an unknown entity or, to use a pejorative term, a 'homunculus.' He concludes that I really only need a processing approach for an adequate theory of visual consciousness. His concern is compatible with the philosophical significance of Occam's razor: one should not multiply entities beyond what is explanatorily required. Admittedly, one need not dispute Occam's razor. However, shaving off the cognitive subject would be justified only if the cognitive subject made no explanatory difference to a theory of visual consciousness. But the cognitive subject makes an explanatory difference-in the very least as a persistence relation with respect to the temporal hierarchy of individual feature representations (see LaRock, 2007) . So, shaving off the cognitive subject would be unjustified. I had suggested that if we take the cognitive subject seriously as part of an overall theory of visual consciousness, we might be able to deepen our understanding of the diachronic (or persistence) aspect of object feature binding. concerns here. Let us begin by addressing the root of van Leeuwen's perplexity and then look at some specific objections he poses to my evaluation of neuronal synchrony as a purported solution of the object feature binding problem.
What is the root of van Leeuwen's perplexity? We shall see that it stems from the following set of claims that he makes, using Wikipedia to cite and discuss a 'widespread understanding' of a binding problem:
According to a particularly widespread understanding, the binding problem is 'the problem of how the unity of conscious perception is brought about by the distributed activities of the central nervous system' (Revonsuo & Newman, 1999 , cited on Wikipedia …). If we take this (too) literally, a solution to the binding problem would be sufficient to explain the unity of objects in conscious visual experience. Few have taken this strong thesis as serious as LaRock did. (van Leeuwen, p. 779) First, since I do not actually address the work of Revonsuo and Newman in my article, I could not have possibly taken a strong thesis or (for that matter) any thesis related to their work. This would suggest that the starting assumption of van Leeuwen's evaluation of my article rests upon a mischaracterization. Yet, no mischaracterization of an author's work has ever counted as an effective rebuttal. Second, van Leeuwen leads us to believe that he is going to evaluate my formulation of the vision-related object feature binding problem. However, in many places he, in fact, evaluates Revonsuo and Newman's formulation of 'the binding problem,' which is apparently a problem about 'the unity of conscious perception' (in general) and thus is not limited to the visionrelated object feature binding problem that I actually formulate and address in my article. So, what van Leeuwen leads us to believe he is going to evaluate and what he really evaluates are not always the same. Even if his criticisms of Revonsuo and Newman's formulation are valid, they are utterly irrelevant to my formulation. After all, my formulation is not about 'the unity of conscious perception' (in general), but is about the vision-related object feature binding problem (in particular). An accurate understanding of my formulation reveals that I have delimited the scope of my inquiry (see LaRock, 2007) . Third, why would van Leeuwen consult Wikipedia (of all sources) to elaborate a binding problem about 'the unity of conscious perception' that, in effect, is too broad to accurately characterize and evaluate whether my formulation of the vision-related object feature binding problem is plausible? One could reasonably infer that his perplexity arises only because he creates a straw-man version of my view in the first place. Van Leeuwen also poses the following query: 'He [LaRock] argues that neural synchrony, the proposed solution to the binding problem, is not sufficient to explain the unity of objects in visual consciousness. Did anyone claim it was?' (p. 779). For one thing, I do not hold that neural synchrony is the proposed solution of the object feature binding problem, but only a purported solution of the object feature binding problem. If I actually held that neural synchrony were the proposed binding mechanism put forward by neuroscientists, I would not have 802 THEORY & PSYCHOLOGY 17(6) examined other purported solutions of the object feature binding problem, such as those based on attentional mechanisms and/or neural coalitions. By keeping this in mind, we can effectively parry van Leeuwen's charge of 'tunnel vision' (p. 779). In the above-quoted passage, van Leeuwen also asks whether anyone ever claimed that neural synchrony was a sufficient condition of object feature binding in visual consciousness. Actually, some neuroscientists have maintained this view. For example, Crick and Koch (1990) and Crick (1994) were strong advocates of neural synchrony as a sufficient condition of object feature binding in visual consciousness. In fact, they have only recently expressed why they no longer maintain this position: 'We no longer think that synchronized firing, such as the so-called 40 Hz oscillations, is a sufficient condition for the NCC [neural correlates of consciousness]' (Crick & Koch, 2003, p. 123, italics added) . 5 By implication, Crick and Koch (1990) did at one time defend the view that neural synchrony was a sufficient condition of object feature binding in visual consciousness. They even explicitly refer to their 1990 publication ('Towards a Neurobiological Theory of Consciousness') as representative of this position (e.g., see Crick & Koch, 2003, p. 123) . This should be enough to answer van Leeuwen's query: 'Did anyone claim it was?' 6 Furthermore, I recognize that even Crick and Koch, who were strong advocates of neural synchrony as a sufficient condition of object feature binding in visual consciousness, had expressed some doubts that neural synchrony could suffice to explain all aspects of consciousness, such as qualia (see Crick & Koch, 1990, p. 264) . This is probably why they usually clarify that what they seek to explain (i.e., the explanandum) is the unity of an object's features ('form, color, motion, etc.') in visual consciousness (see also Crick, 1994, p. 208) . At the same time, Crick and Koch (1990) , along with a legion of other neuroscientists, have defended the view that neuronal synchrony could be what explains (i.e., could be the explanans of) object feature binding in visual consciousness (see also Crick, 1994, pp. 244-245) . This underscores the difference between the explanandum and the explanans. This distinction motivates a rhetorical question: don't I, in fact, provide an elaboration of the explanandum in my article, which is the unity of an object's features in visual consciousness (see LaRock, 2007) ?
Even so, van Leeuwen would have us believe that my criticism of neural synchrony as a purported mechanism of object feature binding rests on the mistaken assumption that neural synchrony ultimately fails on grounds that it cannot solve the hard problem of phenomenal experience, the problem of why experience should arise from matter in the first place (see Chalmers, 1995) . Not only do I not make this claim, but I also discuss how advocates of a neural theory of visual consciousness could respond to this sort of charge. 7 For example:
Crick and Koch could reply that they are merely attempting to explain how the features of an object appear to consciousness in a unitary way. By taking these points into account, the perplexity expressed by van Leeuwen disappears. With the space that is available, let us now look at a few specific objections that he raises concerning my evaluation of neural synchrony as a purported mechanism of object feature binding.
Van Leeuwen critiques my second argument (on the limitations of neural synchrony as a purported binding mechanism) on grounds that there are animal studies that use lighter forms of anesthesia, which probably do not produce a loss of consciousness. This would suggest that we should not reject oscillatory synchronization in the gamma frequency range as the distinctive neural correlate of binding on grounds that consciousness is still present, though to a lesser degree, in lighter anesthesia cases. However, it is still the case that there are animal studies that use deeper forms of anesthesia, which do produce a loss of consciousness; and yet the same form of gamma activity that correlates with the animal's waking (conscious) life also correlates with the animal's anestheticinduced loss of consciousness (e.g., see Imas, Ropella, Wood, & Hudetz, 2004) . Therefore, oscillatory synchronization in the gamma frequency range cannot be the distinctive neural correlate of binding in visual consciousness. 8 Furthermore, in addition to enhancing gamma activity, this deeper form of anesthesia does not prevent the transmission of visual information to striate cortex. Evidently visual information processing occurs at higher levels of the visual cortex even under deeper forms of anesthesia. Although the brain is functioning as if the animal were conscious (e.g., evoked, i.e., stimulus-locked, gamma activity is still possible), the animal is nevertheless not conscious. Therefore, gamma activity cannot be the distinctive neural correlate of the animal's visual (and perhaps other sensory modes of) consciousness. Metaphysically speaking, this raises deeper questions about what is being rendered unconscious. It cannot be the animal's brain, for the same activity is present in both waking conscious states and anestheticinduced unconscious states. Could it be that what is being rendered unconscious is the essential cognitive subject that I discuss, instead of the brain to which the cognitive subject relates?
Although van Leeuwen might concede the preceding rejoinder, he would most likely say (in his own defense) that 'whatever formal mechanism is responsible for binding, such as neural synchronization, is necessary (but not sufficient) for conscious perception' (see van Leeuwen, p. 780) . Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to assume that binding is a necessary condition for visual (and perhaps other modes of) conscious perception. For example, prosopagnosics can no longer 804 THEORY & PSYCHOLOGY 17(6) bind the features of faces together, yet it would be a mistake to conclude that they lack consciousness of the face parts they do, in fact, consciously perceive. Even if neural synchronization is necessary for consciousness (in some sense), we need not also maintain that it is the likely neural candidate of object feature binding in visual consciousness, as defenders of synchrony of activation often claim. For example, although Engel (2003) is careful to say (1) that phenomenal consciousness probably requires multiple mechanisms (e.g., attentional mechanisms, the mechanisms of working memory, etc.), he also maintains (2) that synchrony of activation is the likely neural 'candidate' that provides an 'elegant solution' to the object feature binding problem of visual consciousness (see pp. 133-134). Now, one could grant that neural synchrony is necessary for consciousness (in some sense) without also granting that it is the distinctive neural correlate of object feature binding in visual consciousness. Therefore, one could accept claim (1), but deny claim (2). It would be useful, then, to motivate a distinction between what might be necessary for visual (and perhaps other sensory modes of) consciousness versus some of the dominantly purported neural mechanistic solutions of the object feature binding problem of visual consciousness. However, whatever formal mechanism is required for visual consciousness cannot itself be a mechanism of binding because, as we have already seen in the case of prosopagnosics, binding is not a necessary condition for visual consciousness.
Van Leeuwen (2007) argues against the feasibility of an enduring object representation on the basis of change blindness experiments. His argument can be summarized in modus tollens as follows:
1. If color really is bound to an enduring object representation, then I would notice a change. (Say, for example, van Leeuwen changes a red chair cushion for a blue chair cushion while I step out of his office temporarily.) 2. I do not notice a change. 3. So, there is no binding.
First, if I fail to notice this change upon returning to the room, this might only show that red is not bound to the memory of the chair cushion at the time that I return to the room. Even so, van Leeuwen seems to infer that red could not have been bound to the chair cushion prior to leaving the room. But this inference does not follow. For example, red might have been bound to the chair cushion but this binding was somehow lost in working memory. Second, it is possible that because the representation of the room is so massively complex, I'm just not good at noticing every feature of the objects that make up the total representational scene, and thus it is not surprising that I might fail to notice any change that might have occurred to one of the objects upon my returning. Third, van Leeuwen's analysis ultimately conflates questions about memory consistency of some feature of an object representation and questions about object feature binding. For it implicitly assumes that binding occurs only if an object representation is memory consistent. Without further proof it is difficult to see why we should accept this assumption.
Finally, van Leeuwen maintains that the binding problem is really a problem of associationism. Even if some have held to the view that questions about binding are really just questions about association, this does not settle the matter. First of all, several theorists have been careful to draw distinctions between feature disambiguation (or association) and feature binding in the neuroscience and related philosophy literature (e.g., see Luck & Beach, 1998; Treisman, 2003; see also LaRock, 2002 see also LaRock, , 2006 see also LaRock, , 2007 . Furthermore, how the brain selectively tags (i.e., disambiguates or associates) the correct stimulus features as belonging to its respective object (when two or more objects are present in the subject's visual field) is conceptually distinct from how the features of an object are bound together as a single, unified object of visual consciousness. It is, therefore, a conceptual mistake to run the questions of disambiguation (or association) and binding together. If anything, this point should help to clarify the different roles that disambiguation (or association) and binding play in our cognitive architecture, and reinvigorate an important question of binding in the philosophy of mind and related neurosciences: if the feature representations of an object correlate with activity in different areas of the visual cortex, then how are such features bound together as a single, unified object of visual consciousness? Because this question concerns the unity of an object's features, it is logically independent of the question of disambiguation. However, if two or more objects are present before one's visual field, then presumably questions of binding and disambiguation would be applicable.
Van Leeuwen raises a few other issues, but unfortunately the space allowed doesn't permit a response. What I have raised already, however, demonstrates that several of his responses to my criticisms are less than compelling. Phenomenal, in this context, refers only to the way an object/event appears to visual consciousness. Thus we can set aside qualia and other properties that have no relevant bearing on the issue at hand. Similarly, Engel (2003) describes visual awareness as a basic form of 'phenomenal consciousness' (p. 133). In ordinary circumstances, visual awareness of an object is an awareness of a single, featureunified object over time (i.e., diachronically) and at a time (i.e., synchronically). This description is taken to refer to a basic form of visual consciousness. 2. Though space does not permit a full-fledged response here, it might also be noted that van der Velde's objection implies a false dilemma: one must take either a processing approach or a cognitive subject approach. Is there no room for a tertium quid? For example, my approach to visual consciousness implies that both a processing approach and a cognitive subject approach could help to contribute to an overall explanation of visual consciousness. This, of course, assumes that it is possible to embrace explanatory pluralism without also excluding (i.e., eliminating) 806 THEORY & PSYCHOLOGY 17(6) the cognitive subject or embracing reductionism: 'Connecting scientific domains may not at all be like annexing and rebuilding psychology by neuroscience, as reductionists suggest, but more like building passages between one part of the many semi-detached buildings of science and another' (Schouten & Looren de Jong, 2007, p. 24 ; see also Varela & Thompson, 2003) . 3. Recall, I bolstered this view after providing a critical examination of some possible neural mechanistic solutions to the problem of diachronic object unity. 4. Notice, further, that I make no reference in my article to Wikipedia as a professional resource with respect to the vision-related object feature binding problem and neural solutions that have been offered to it. Is van Leeuwen suggesting that we should consult Wikipedia to deepen our understanding of the problems of binding and other serious scientific and philosophical problems? 5. Crick and Koch's (2003) revised view says that 'the 'binding' of the features of a single object/event is simply the membership in a particular coalition' (p. 123, italics added). Instead of neural synchrony as the purported explanans of object feature binding, their revised view says that membership in a particular coalition is enough to bind together the features of an object/event. 6. Of course, Crick and Koch (1990) are not the only theorists who have argued that synchrony of activation could be what explains object feature binding in visual consciousness. For example, Engel (2003) alleges that the likely 'candidate' of object feature binding is 'precise synchronization of neuronal discharges' (p. 133; see also LaRock, 2005 LaRock, , 2007 . Incidentally, Crick's (1994) avowed commitment to a neural theory of consciousness, which was clearly expressed in his The Astonishing Hypothesis, is not limited to the area of visual consciousness. For example, he claimed that his proposed hypothesis had far-reaching implications in the sense that emotional experiences, such as joy and sorrow, memories, ambitions, and even one's 'sense of personal identity and free will are nothing but a pack of neurons. This hypothesis is so alien to the ideas of most people alive today that it can truly be called astonishing' (Crick, 1994, p. 3, italics added) . These claims are compatible with reductive physicalism. 7. For clarification, Chalmers would not make this claim either; because, for him, the binding problem is a problem of information integration, which he characterizes as one of the 'easy problems of consciousness' (see Chalmers, 1995, p. 200) . 8. As a general rule of logic, only one counterexample is required to challenge the veracity of a claim.
